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Abstract
This paper studies spillovers across sovereign debt markets in the wake
of sovereign rating changes. We compile an extensive dataset covering all
announcements by the three major agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s,
Fitch) and daily sovereign bond market movements of up to 73 developed and
emerging countries between 1994 and 2011. To cleanly identify the existence
of spillover effects, we perform an explicit counterfactual analysis which pits
bond market reactions to small revisions in ratings against reactions to all
other, more major changes. We also control for the environment in which an
announcement is made, such as the anticipation through watchlistings and
the interaction of similar rating actions by different agencies. While there is
strong evidence of negative spillover effects in response to downgrades, positive
spillovers from upgrades are much more limited at best. Furthermore, negative
spillover effects are more pronounced for countries within the same region.
Strikingly, this cannot be explained by fundamental linkages and similarities
between countries.
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1 Introduction
Ever since tensions began to surface in the eurozone in late 2009, the announcements
by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the creditworthiness of member states have
continuously made the headlines and rattled financial markets. In particular, while
not specific to the ongoing crisis, the notion that rating actions pertaining to one
country might have a major impact on the yields of other countries’ sovereign bonds,
too, has regained the attention of policymakers. In fact, concerns over so-called
negative spillover effects have been running so deep that the European Commission
was at one stage considering a temporary restriction on the issuance of ratings under
exceptional circumstances (Financial Times, 2011). This provides the background
for why the Commission has just recently set up stricter rules for the agencies. In
particular, CRAs are now only allowed to issue three ratings for EU member states’
sovereign debt at pre-defined dates every year (European Union, 2013).
These considerations carry two major assumptions on the behaviour of sovereign
bond markets in the wake of rating announcements. The first assumption is that,
when a rating announcement is made for one country, there exist significant spillover
effects on other countries’ sovereign bond markets. Conditional on their existence,
the second assumption posits that such spillovers must, in one way or another,
be unwarranted to merit an intervention by the state. In more technical terms,
it suggests that spillovers are unrelated to economic fundamentals. While both
assumptions are highly policy relevant and therefore deserve close scrutiny, they are
not straightforward to test.
This paper sets out to cleanly identify the existence of cross-border spillover effects
of sovereign rating announcements, and to establish the economic conditions under
which those effects are strongest, or which countries are affected most. To this
end, we collect an extensive dataset which comprises a complete history of both
the sovereign rating actions by the “Big Three” (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and
Fitch) and daily sovereign bond market movements for up to 73 countries between
1994 and 2011. The dataset contains substantial variation as it covers both crisis
and non-crisis periods as well as a broad set of developed and emerging countries
across all continents.
Crucially, the variation allows us to pursue a novel empirical strategy to identify
potential spillover effects. More precisely, we perform an explicit counterfactual
analysis which pits bond market reactions to small revisions in an agency’s assess-
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ment of a country’s creditworthiness against bond market reactions to all other,
more major changes. This not only helps us get around the problems associated
with a classic event-study approach in a spillover context. It also does not require
the additional assumptions made by a number of papers.
A traditional event-study procedure, where bond market movements in an esti-
mation window serve as the counterfactual for bond market reactions in an event
window, is suitable in principle but, in a spillover context, places too high demands
on the necessary non-contamination of the estimation window. This is because, if
one entertains the possibility of cross-border spillovers after rating announcements,
each country’s bond yields are potentially affected by any sovereign rating change in
the world. The estimation window can therefore only be considered uncontaminated
if no such change has occurred anywhere. As the number of instances where this
can be ensured is extremely low, the classic event-study approach appears ill-suited
to thoroughly identify spillover effects. Hence, in this paper, we focus on a pooled
cross section of short event windows, in which small changes of the actual rating
serve as the counterfactual for larger changes.
While some papers also investigate spillovers in a pooled cross section framework,
their analyses do not postulate an explicit counterfactual, as we do.1 Instead, they
rely on a “comprehensive credit rating” which combines two different types of rat-
ing announcements — actual rating changes and watch, or review, changes — into
a single scale. Their identification therefore depends on rather strong additional
assumptions on the relative informational content of reviews and ratings. We, how-
ever, focus solely on the class of actual rating changes. In detail, we test whether a
country’s sovereign bonds react more heavily to upgrades or downgrades elsewhere
when those are “large” — ie, when the actual rating changes by two notches or
more. The group of “small” one-notch changes serves as the counterfactual during
that exercise. At the same time, we explicitly allow for differences in the informa-
tional content of sovereign rating changes by controlling for watchlistings that may
build anticipation in the market. Moreover, we are also able to account for the fact
that an announcement is often followed by a similar one from a different agency
soon after, which may further influence the reception of the later announcements.2
1See Afonso et al. (2012), Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012), Gande and Parsley (2005), and
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010).
2To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider such interactions between the major
CRAs in identifying spillover effects.
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Our findings on the existence of cross-border spillover effects point to an important
asymmetry in the sovereign debt market’s treatment of ratings. On the one hand,
we find significant spillovers in the wake of sovereign rating downgrades, which turn
out to be robust to a number of tests. On the other hand, reactions to upgrades
appear to be much more muted, if anything.
We then investigate to what extent spillovers are driven by country characteristics.
Importantly, we find that spillovers from downgrades tend to be significantly more
pronounced for countries within the same region. We proceed by testing whether
this can be explained by bilateral trade linkages, financial integration or fundamental
similarities between countries. However, even after controlling for these factors, we
still find that belonging to a common region amplifies cross-border spillover effects.
Hence, our findings suggest that policymakers’ concerns over some countries being
found “guilty by association” cannot be easily dismissed.
Our paper is related to a broad strand of literature that investigates the effects of
sovereign rating announcements on different segments of the financial markets. The
most common exercise is to conduct an event study gauging the direct impact of
rating changes on the bonds issued by the country concerned. However, there is
also a substantial body of research analysing the reaction of the country’s stock
and, more recently, of its CDS market. As a general result, this literature finds a
strong and significant impact of sovereign rating downgrades, while upgrades have
an insignificant or more limited impact (see, eg, Cantor and Packer, 1996; Larra´ın
et al., 1997; Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999; Brooks et al., 2004; Hooper et al., 2008;
Hill and Faff, 2010).
Moreover, in recent years a growing body of research has specifically studied whether
sovereign rating changes also lead to spillover effects on other countries’ sovereign
bonds. Generally speaking, the literature affirms the existence of such spillovers,
meaning that a rating action on one country is found to significantly affect the
sovereign bond prices of other countries (eg, Arezki et al., 2011; De Santis, 2012;
Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). Some studies also point out that spillovers are not
limited to sovereign debt markets but that rating changes also affect foreign stock
and exchange markets (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; Arezki et al., 2011; Alsakka
and ap Gwilym, 2012). Regarding a potential asymmetry in the spillover effects of
negative and positive rating events, the results of the literature so far remain incon-
clusive. Whereas Afonso et al. (2012) find spillovers to matter most for downgrades,
with little or no effects of sovereign upgrades, Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) find
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positive rating events to have a greater spillover effect on foreign CDS prices than
negative ones.
With the exception of Gande and Parsley (2005), these studies focus either on
spillover effects during specific regional crisis episodes3 or on an otherwise homoge-
neous sample of countries only, such as emerging countries (Ismailescu and Kazemi,
2010; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002). In addition to some of the shortcomings al-
ready mentioned above, this leaves open the question to what extent their findings
are of more general relevance.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe the dataset
and highlight some important characteristics of rating announcements. Section 3
discusses the estimation strategy for identifying cross-border spillovers. Section 4
presents our empirical results and discusses their interpretation. We end with a brief
conclusion.
2 Data
2.1 The dataset
For our study, we compile a broad dataset of the yields of publicly traded sovereign
bonds at daily frequency. The dataset starts in January 1994 and ends in December
2011. Since for many countries data are only available after 1994, we add those coun-
tries’ sovereign bonds as soon as reliable information becomes available. Whereas
our dataset only comprises sovereign bonds issued by 27 countries in 1994, this num-
ber increases to 74 countries towards the end of our sample period. This reflects
both the increased financing needs of sovereigns and the growing prevalence of bond
issuance, as opposed to bank financing, during the last 20 years. While for 1994
sovereign bond yields are mostly available for developed countries, the availability of
emerging market bond yields picks up heavily over our sample period. Towards the
end of the period, emerging markets even account for the bulk of sovereign bonds
in the sample. Figure 1 illustrates the increasing scope of our dataset over time.
In order to consider a broad spectrum of sovereign bonds, our sample draws on
data from different sources. Our preferred data source is Bloomberg, from which
3See Afonso et al. (2012), Arezki et al. (2011), and De Santis (2012) for the eurozone crisis,
Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) for the 1997/98 Asian crisis.
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Figure 1: Number of sovereign bonds in dataset
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Notes — This figure shows the scope and composition, by economic development, of the sovereign bond sample
between 1994 and 2011, highlighting a notable increase in the coverage of emerging economies over time. Countries
are classified according to the IMF World Economic Outlook.
we use generic 10-year yields for up to 33 countries. If data are not available on
Bloomberg, we supplement them with yields from Datastream’s 10-year Government
Bond Benchmark Index, ensuring that this does not induce structural breaks in the
series. Since sovereign bond availability for emerging markets is quite limited both
on Bloomberg and on Datastream, we also use data from the JP Morgan Emerging
Markets Bond Index Global (henceforth EMBI Global, see JP Morgan, 1999). While
bonds included in the EMBI Global have to fulfil strict requirements regarding the
availability of reliable daily prices, the average maturity of a country’s bond index
can vary remarkably from that of the other two sources. We therefore control for
maturity in all regressions. Table A.1 in the Appendix gives a detailed overview of
the sovereign bond market data included in our sample.
For the purpose of our later analysis, we compute sovereign bond spreads. The
spread is the differential of the country’s sovereign bond yield over that of a US
Treasury bond of comparable maturity. We use 10-year maturities where possible,
which is the case for the developed economies and some emerging markets. For the
other emerging economies, we rely on the EMBI Global data. As those correspond
to different maturities (depending on the average maturity of eligible instruments
a country has issued), we obtain the relevant US Treasury yields by interpolating
from the closest published yield curve rates.
Information on sovereign ratings comes from the rating agencies’ websites and in-
cludes daily information both on rating changes and on sovereign watchlistings by
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Figure 2: Number of rated countries
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Notes — This figure shows the scope and composition, by economic development, of the sample of countries rated
by at least one of the major rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) between 1994 and 2011, with a notable increase
in the coverage of emerging economies over time. Countries are classified according to the IMF World Economic
Outlook.
any of the “Big Three” (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) from 1994 to 2011. We choose the
year 1994 as a natural starting point for our sample period since Fitch only started
to assign sovereign ratings in that year. Like the number of publicly traded sovereign
bonds, the scope and composition of countries rated by the “Big Three” changes
quite substantially during our sample period. While in 1994 only 34 sovereigns were
rated by at least one of the agencies, this number had increased to 98 countries by
2011 (see Figure 2).
2.2 Characteristics of rating announcements
Over the whole sample period, we are able to consider a total of 1,097 rating changes,
of which 635 were upgrades and 462 downgrades. In general, one can observe a
significant increase in the number of sovereign credit ratings during our sample
period, particularly in emerging market countries.
As Figure 3 illustrates, rating activity is not evenly distributed over time but, es-
pecially for downgrades, shows some hefty peaks during specific episodes of crisis.
Whereas in “normal times”, downgrades tend to be relatively scarce, a severe in-
crease can be observed in the context of the 1997/98 Asian crisis (affecting mostly
emerging countries plus South Korea and Hong Kong) and following the 2008–2011
financial and European debt crises (where for the first time advanced economies were
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Figure 3: Rating actions over time
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Notes — This figure shows upgrades and downgrades of developed and emerging economies made by S&P, Moody’s
and Fitch between 1994 and 2011. Countries are classified according to the IMF World Economic Outlook.
exposed to downgrades at a large scale). This means that similar announcements
tend to cluster around certain time periods.
In addition, it is an important stylised fact that the downgrading of a country is
frequently followed by yet another downgrade announcement for that same coun-
try soon after. This is all the more probable because there is a strong overlap in
country coverage by the “Big Three”. Almost all countries in our sample are rated
by more than one agency only and most are even rated by all three (70 out of 98
countries at the end of 2011). Hence, in what we term within-clustering, different
agencies may make the same announcement for a given country in short succession
or even on the same day. Figure 4 illustrates this issue by plotting the cumulative
distribution function and summary statistics of the number of days between simi-
lar rating actions on the same country. As can be seen, clustering is particularly
pronounced for downgrades. In around five per cent of all cases, a downgrade on a
country is followed by another downgrade on that country within just one day. For
example, in the course of the Asian crisis, S&P, Fitch and Moody’s all downgraded
South Korea’s credit rating on successive days between 25 and 27 November 1997.
Similarly, during the ongoing European debt crisis, Fitch issued a downgrade for
Greece on 8 December 2009. One week later, S&P downgraded the country as well,
as did Moody’s yet another six days later.
The presence of clustering might be of crucial importance when examining the
spillover effects from a rating announcement since its informational content is likely
to vary depending on whether it has been announced in isolation or just a few days
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Figure 4: Clustering of rating announcements
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462 downgrades) made by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch between 1994 and 2011.
after (or even on the same day as) a similar announcement by another agency. Not
to control for these cases could seriously bias estimation results for the impart of
rating announcements on sovereign bond markets.
Clustering across countries may matter, too. When CRAs change the rating of a
number of different countries in the same direction simultaneously, one needs to
control for the fact that some countries will then be both “non-event” and event
countries. Otherwise, one might erroneously detect spillovers across sovereign bond
markets when, in fact, one is looking at a spillover in ratings. This is all the more
important if the countries concerned share a common trait of some form which leads
CRAs to make simultaneous announcements for the countries concerned in the first
place, as appears to have happened on 3 October 2008 when Fitch downgraded
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.4 It is therefore a major advantage of our dataset
that it enables us to explicitly take into account prior and parallel rating actions by
other CRAs and on other countries.
Similarly, the informational content of a rating change might be conditional on
whether it has been preceded by the respective country being put on a watch-
list. As the literature on the effects of rating announcements on the refinancing
conditions of the very same country shows (eg, Afonso et al., 2012; Ismailescu and
Kazemi, 2010), rating changes are often preceded by a similar change in the market’s
4Other examples may be seen in S&P’s downgrade announcements for South Korea and Taiwan
during the Asian crisis on 24 October 1997, or in Fitch lowering the ratings of Estonia, Ireland,
Latvia and Lithuania on 8 April 2009.
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assessment of sovereign risk, especially when countries have been put “on watch”,
or “review”, before.5 Ignoring these anticipation effects risks underestimating bond
market reactions to a sovereign rating action. Since our dataset includes all sovereign
watchlistings by the “Big Three”, we can directly control for a country’s watchlist
status and mitigate potential problems with anticipation.
3 Identifying sovereign spillovers
3.1 Counterfactual choice and estimation strategy
The existence of rating spillover effects in the sovereign debt market requires, by
definition, that the announcement by a CRA on the creditworthiness of one country
(event country) impacts significantly on the bond yields of another (non-event coun-
try). Yet, the mere observation of a change in non-event country yields when an
event-country announcement is made does not suffice to establish a causal relation
because non-event country yields might have changed regardless. Hence, the key
issue in identifying potential spillover effects is to find a suitable counterfactual.
We cannot apply the procedure traditionally used in event studies on direct an-
nouncement effects, however. This strand of literature focuses on, for instance, the
bond yield response of a sovereign that has been downgraded. In this framework,
effects are identified by the existence of abnormal returns, meaning that around the
announcement (event window), returns are significantly different from normal, as
estimated over a longer time frame before the announcement (estimation window).
In order to be a reasonable guide to normal returns, the estimation window has to
be chosen such that other events with a potentially significant impact on returns are
excluded (see, eg, MacKinlay, 1997). In other words, the counterfactual for gauging
the impact of rating announcements is “no rating change”. While this represents a
challenge in direct announcement studies already, which focus on countries in isola-
tion, the identification of spillover effects based on this counterfactual is essentially
impossible.
The reason is that, in a spillover context, we would require that there be no an-
nouncements on any rated country within the estimation window.6 There is obvi-
5In the following, we use the two terms interchangeably. While S&P and Fitch issue watchlist-
ings, in the Moody’s terminology those are called “reviews”.
6The universe of all rated countries is the relevant benchmark when analysing potential spillover
effects in this framework. Of course, if we only required the estimation window to be free of
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ously a trade-off between the length of that window and the number of announce-
ments eligible for inclusion in the estimation. However, even at a 30-day length
commonly used in sovereign event studies, which is towards the shorter end of the
event-study literature more generally, only 23 upgrades would be eligible, and 36
downgrades.
We therefore pursue an identification strategy that does not rely on “no rating
change at all” as its counterfactual, but which discriminates between rating changes
according to their severity. More precisely, rating changes of a single notch serve as
the counterfactual for more severe changes of two notches or more.7 This approach
is implemented in the following estimation equation, which we run on upgrades and
downgrades separately:
∆Spreadn,t = α + β · LARGEe,t +RatEnve,n,t · γ +Othere,n,t · δ + ωe,n,t .
The dependent variable ∆Spreadn,t is the change in non-event country n’s bond
spread vis-a`-vis the United States over the two-trading-day window [−1,+1] around
the announcement on day 0 of a change in the rating of event country e (6= n).
The event window length accounts for the fact that by the time a CRA announces
a rating change on day 0, markets in some parts of the world may have already
closed. Hence, any impact on those would not materialise before day +1, and would
go undetected using a shorter [−1, 0] window. The same argument applies to rating
announcements made after the exchange has closed in the country concerned, which
we cannot distinguish from those made during trading.8
The key regressor in identifying possible spillover effects is LARGEe,t, a dummy that
takes on a value of one if e’s rating is changed by two notches or more, and zero
otherwise. We thereby treat rating changes of two notches or more as one single
group. This is due to the distribution of the severity of upgrades and downgrades
in our sample, which is shown in Figure 5.
announcements pertaining to the non-event country, the number of events eligible for inclusion
would increase substantially. However, this would amount to assuming from the outset that only
direct effects, as opposed to spillover effects, could possibly matter, which would defy the purpose
of the investigation.
7See Table A.2 in the Appendix on the mapping of CRAs’ letter ratings into a linear 17-notch
scale.
8CRAs have made post-trading announcements during the eurozone crisis, for instance (Finan-
cial Times, 2010; Wall Street Journal, 2012). In financial markets more generally, information
which is deemed highly relevant is frequently released when exchanges are closed in order to limit
or smooth the impact on prices.
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Figure 5: Distribution of rating changes
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Notes — This figure shows the distribution of the severity of rating changes, measured on a 17-notch scale (see
Table A.2 in the Appendix). Numbers are based on the sample of 1,097 rating announcements (635 upgrades, 462
downgrades) made by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch between 1994 and 2011.
The vast majority of rating announcements result in a one-notch change in a coun-
try’s rating. Beyond that, we observe a significant amount of events only for changes
of two notches, while changes of three notches or more occur only very rarely. There-
fore, we do not include separate dummy variables for the latter categories but group
all rating changes of two notches or more into a single bin.
In this framework, positive (negative) spillover effects are equivalent to a drop (rise)
in the spreads of country n which is significantly more pronounced in response to
a two-or-more-notches upgrade (downgrade) of country e than to a single-notch
one. We would then expect β to be significantly negative (positive) in the upgrade
(downgrade) regressions.
This counterfactual choice also has implications for the estimation technique. Since
we do not use “no change” as the counterfactual (due to the estimation window
problem outlined above), we identify spillover effects in pooled cross sections of
upgrades and downgrades rather than in a true panel setup.9 We estimate the
model by OLS.
At this point, it seems important to address some potential concerns about a possible
endogeneity of the large-change dummy. The implicit assumption in the above
design is that the rating announcement and its severity are not systematically related
9Thus, t denotes generic rather than actual time and can be thought of as indexing the different
rating events.
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to other spread-relevant information in the event window. Otherwise, LARGE and
the error term ω would be correlated, and β would be biased.
One concern might be, for instance, that CRAs downgrade a country instanta-
neously in reaction to “bad news” and do so by more notches for “particularly bad
news”. Note that an instantaneous response to other spread-relevant information
per se would not induce any endogeneity in our framework whereas “fine-tuning”
the severity of rating changes, conditional on an immediate response, clearly would.
Hence, we demonstrate that there is very little to suggest instantaneous-response
behaviour on the part of CRAs to begin with, and that endogeneity is therefore not
a major issue in this regard. We would like to stress two points in particular.
Restricting the event window to two days already goes a long way towards alleviating
the problem by limiting the amount of information that might potentially correlate
with the large-change dummy. In other words, the scope for other relevant news to
incite an immediate reaction from CRAs is rather small, even if such behaviour was
characteristic of rating agencies and their announcements.
In addition, the proclaimed practice and a corresponding body of empirical litera-
ture suggest otherwise. The agencies state a preference for stable ratings (see, eg,
Cantor, 2001; Cantor and Mann, 2003, 2007; Standard & Poor’s, 2010), intending
to announce a change only if it is unlikely to be reversed in the near future. This
“through the cycle” approach contrasts with a “point in time” approach in that
cyclical phenomena should not, in themselves, trigger rating changes. If CRAs ac-
tually pursued a stable rating policy, the fact that cyclical and permanent factors are
difficult to disentangle (International Monetary Fund, 2010) should imply some de-
lay between new information becoming available and an ensuing change in the credit
rating. Empirical evidence for corporate bond rating indicates that this practice is
indeed followed, thus reducing the timeliness of rating changes (Altman and Rijken,
2004; Liu et al., 2011), and that the CRAs are “slow” in processing new information
(Lo¨ﬄer, 2005). This perception has also been expressed in investor surveys (Associa-
tion for Financial Professionals, 2002; Baker and Mansi, 2002). Moreover, Sy (2004)
notes for the sovereign sector that it may simply be concerns about rating changes
precipitating significant increases in borrowing costs or outright crises which make
CRAs opt for somewhat less timely announcements.
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A second concern might be biases arising from differences across agencies in a pooled
setup, as pointed out by Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012).10 Suppose, for example,
that the large rating changes in our sample stemmed primarily from an agency in
whose judgments the market placed more trust. Then, by pooling the announce-
ments of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, we would be picking up differences in the cred-
ibility of these CRAs rather than identifying spillover effects across sovereign bond
markets. However, Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows that this is not very likely,
in particular for downgrades where changes of two notches or more are distributed
quite evenly across agencies: 32 for S&P, 46 for Moody’s, and 30 for Fitch.11 We
are therefore confident that our approach provides a sound identification of spillover
effects.
3.2 The rating environment
The rating environment may play an important role for the bond market reaction
to an upgrade or downgrade announcement. Our regressions therefore control for
a number of different rating variables, contained in RatEnve,n,t. For example, the
spillover potential of a rating action might depend on the creditworthiness of the
event country, which we proxy by the rating it held with the announcing CRA
on the day before (InitRate,t). We also include the absolute difference between
the event country’s initial rating and that of the non-event country (∆InitRate,n,t).
This is because one might expect bilateral effects to differ depending on how similar
countries are in terms of creditworthiness.
In addition, it is well established in the literature that the impact of rating announce-
ments may vary according to whether they have been anticipated by the market (eg,
Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Gande and Parsley, 2005; Reisen and von Maltzan,
1999). One potentially important and convenient measure of such anticipation is
whether the actual rating action has been foreshadowed by a CRA putting the re-
spective country on watch, or review (Afonso et al., 2012; Kaminsky and Schmukler,
2002). Hence, we add a dummy that takes on a value of one if a review in the indi-
cated direction has been ongoing at the time of the upgrade or downgrade, and zero
otherwise (OnWatche,t).
10At the same time, the authors acknowledge that studies using pooled data (eg, Kaminsky and
Schmukler, 2002; Sy, 2004) constitute the norm in the literature as opposed to examining rating
changes by CRAs separately.
11While the picture is not quite as unambiguous for upgrades, we have already stressed in the
introduction that those results should be taken with more of a grain of salt (see next section).
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Introducing an explicit control variable differs from Gande and Parsley (2005), who
amalgamate a country’s watch status into a “comprehensive credit rating”. More
precisely, for any given day their measure is defined as the country’s actual letter
rating on a 17-notch scale, raised (lowered) if the country is on review for an upgrade
(downgrade). Presumably due to the counterfactual issue discussed in 3.1, Gande
and Parsley (2005) then focus on those days as events on which there is a non-zero
change in the comprehensive credit rating. However, this identification crucially
involves additional assumptions on how changes in review status and actual rating
changes relate to one another quantitatively. Furthermore, one might argue that,
despite the potential anticipation effects of watchlistings, the latter are not qual-
itatively the same as actual rating changes. In any case, our much larger sample
allows us to avoid those assumptions. We focus instead on the class of actual rating
changes and their relative strengths only while controlling for anticipation through
watchlistings. This should provide for a cleaner identification of spillover effects.
Moreover, we have shown in 2.2 that similar announcements by different CRAs
tend to cluster around certain dates, and that this is particularly true for rat-
ing downgrades. We account for potential clustering within countries by a vari-
able which captures the number of similar announcements made for a particu-
lar country by other agencies over a 14-day window before the respective event
(SimActsWdwEvte,t). For clustering across countries, ie one or more CRAs chang-
ing the rating of more than one country in the same direction simultaneously, we
include the number of similar announcements made on the same day for the“non-
event” country (SimActsDayNonEvte,t).
Finally, we add the volatility measure for the S&P 500 Index in the United States
(VIXt) to control for the “global market sentiment” in which the rating announce-
ment is made. One might, for instance, imagine that in more turbulent times (ie, in
which volatility is high) borrowing conditions deteriorate across the board, so that
spreads over the event window would be more likely to increase in any case. In that
sense, VIXt can be regarded as a technical control, which also adds a genuine time
component to the pooled cross sections.
All regressions include the vector Othere,n,t which contains a fixed set of controls,
such as event and non-event country dummies. Importantly, we also account for
common time effects in the pooled cross sections through the inclusion of year dum-
mies. These capture global macroeconomic trends which might be reflected in the
yields of US Treasuries and, hence, spread changes. For instance, there may be a
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stronger tendency for investments to flow into the US in some years due to a (per-
ceived) “safe haven” status, or a “global savings glut” that has been discussed for
the early 2000s. Moreover, each regression includes the following technical controls:
the maturity of non-event country bonds in levels and squares to account for po-
sitions on the yield curve, a dummy for EMBI Global bond yields, and a dummy
for spread changes that need to be measured over weekends as those correspond to
longer intervals in terms of calendar days.
4 Results
4.1 Existence of cross-border spillover effects
Table 1 shows baseline estimation results on the existence of cross-border effects for
upgrades and downgrades, respectively. We start with a parsimonious specification
in Model 1, which only contains our main variable of interest, the large-change
dummy LARGE and initial ratings. We then control for potential anticipation
effects from watchlistings as well as clustering within and across countries in Model
2. Finally, Model 3 also accounts for global market turbulence, or risk aversion.
The key result is that the large-change dummy has the expected sign for both up-
grades (ie, negative) and downgrades (ie, positive), and that it is highly significant
in both cases. Moreover, this finding appears to be remarkably robust as the co-
efficient on LARGE is very stable and retains its significance across specifications.
Comparison of the absolute coefficients, however, indicates an asymmetry in the
spillover effects induced by upgrades and downgrades, respectively. Downgrades of
two notches or more are associated with an average spread change over the event
window which exceeds that of one-notch downgrades by about 2 basis points. In
contrast, large upgrades are associated with spread changes that are roughly 1.2 ba-
sis points below those of one-notch upgrades. The asymmetry is also reflected in the
lower significance levels for upgrades despite a larger number of rating events and
observations. To further corroborate this, we confirm in a separate (unreported) re-
gression that the absolute coefficients for upgrades and downgrades are statistically
different from each other.12
12To this end, we pool all rating changes and replace the event-window spread changes for
upgrades with their negative values for the sake of comparison. We then add a downgrade dummy
(taking on a value of one for downgrades, and zero for upgrades) to all specifications both in levels
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Asymmetries in the reactions to positive and negative events have frequently been
documented in the literature. For instance, Gande and Parsley (2005) find for a
1990s sample of developed and emerging countries that negative rating events in
one country affect sovereign bond spreads in others whereas there is no discernible
impact for positive events. Similar results have been obtained regarding the direct
effects in sovereign bond and CDS markets (Afonso et al., 2012; Larra´ın et al.,
1997), mirroring a well-established finding from event studies on bond, stock, and
CDS returns in the corporate sector (eg, Norden and Weber, 2004; Steiner and
Heinke, 2001; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Hand et al., 1992). Recently, however,
there has also been evidence of symmetric spillover reactions to sovereign rating
announcements in the foreign exchange market (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012), or
even that positive announcements in emerging countries have both stronger direct
and spillover effects in sovereign CDS markets (Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010).
Turning to the rating-environment controls, neither the initial rating of the event
country just before the rating announcement nor the difference in initial ratings be-
tween event and non-event country seem to play a role in terms of spillover effects.
Both coefficients are far from significant across specifications. Previous evidence on
this has been inconclusive. While Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) and Ferreira and
Gama (2007) detect stronger spillover effects in the foreign exchange and stock mar-
kets, respectively, for event countries with lower initial ratings, Gande and Parsley
(2005) find the opposite for bond market reactions (to sovereign downgrades).
We do find some evidence, though, that the impact of an actual rating change on
spreads depends on whether it has been foreshadowed by a watchlisting. The cor-
responding dummy, OnWatch, is signed as expected for both upgrades and down-
grades, yet there is again an asymmetry: the control variable turns out insignifi-
cant in all upgrade specifications but significant at almost the five per cent level
for downgrades (Model 2 in Panel B). A possible explanation for this is given by
Altman and Rijken (2006). They point out that watchlistings partially ease the
tension between the market’s expectation of rating stability and the demand for
rating timeliness. This suggests that watchlistings contribute to the anticipation
of actual rating changes. Given that investors tend to be more concerned about
negative news, watchlistings should be more important in building anticipation for
downgrades than for upgrades. Figures from our dataset support this notion. While
and as interactions with the other explanatory variables. The interaction term of LARGE with the
downgrade dummy is positive and highly significant throughout, pointing to statistically significant
differences in the absolute coefficients for upgrades and downgrades.
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about a third of all downgrades are preceded by a watchlisting, so are only 15 per
cent of all upgrades. Finally, it has often been noted that there is an incentive to
leak good news (eg, Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012; Christopher et al., 2012; Gande
and Parsley, 2005; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986), so
the relevance of watchlistings in building anticipation is conceivably much lower in
the case of upgrades. We interpret the fact that our results are consistent with this
literature as reassuring in terms of the validity of the regression specifications.
Our results also point to the importance of the clustering of rating announce-
ments, especially for downgrades. While the controls for both clustering within
(SimActsWdwEvt) and across countries (SimActsDayNonEvt) are highly significant
in the downgrade regressions, the effect of across-clustering is only marginally signifi-
cant once for upgrades. This appears plausible in light of the stylised facts presented
in 2.2 because simultaneous announcements on several countries by one or more
agencies occur much less frequently for upgrades than for downgrades. Moreover,
the coefficients are correctly signed for both upgrades and downgrades, suggesting
that the spread-decreasing (spread-increasing) spillover effects of an upgrade (down-
grade) are all the more pronounced when one or more upgrades (downgrades) are
announced for the “non-event” country at the same time.
A similar statement regarding the signs cannot be made with the same degree of con-
fidence for SimActsWdwEvt, which measures the number of upgrades (downgrades)
announced by other agencies over a 14-day window before the respective upgrade
(downgrade).13 While we again find strong differences in significance between up-
grades and downgrades as well as opposing signs, one need not necessarily expect
within-clustering to have an additional spread-increasing effect over the event win-
dow for downgrades. Instead, the variable might subsume two opposing effects. On
the one hand, the clustering of downgrades over a short interval could imply that
any announcement is less relevant individually. In that case, one would expect a
negative coefficient. On the other hand, clustering is much more prevalent in cri-
13In choosing the window length, we follow Gande and Parsley (2005) who employ a two-week
duration for a comparable control variable. However, using a one-week or three-week window
instead does not alter the conclusions. Moreover, the reader may note that we do not report a
variable capturing similar rating announcements made on the same day by other agencies. This is
due to the unattractive property that this variable drops out in the upgrade regressions since there
is not a single event of multiple upgrades of a country on the same day in our sample. Therefore,
in the interest of comparability, we choose not to report downgrade regressions with that control
either. These regressions show, however, that the measure is always insignificant for downgrades,
regardless of whether it is included in addition to, or as a stand-in for, SimActsWdwEvt. All results
are available on request.
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sis times (see 2.2). Thus, SimActsWdwEvt tends to be higher in times of market
turbulence or global risk aversion when spreads against a “safe-haven” investment
like US Treasuries are upward-trending, too (eg, Gonza´lez-Rozada and Levy Yeyati,
2008; Garc´ıa-Herrero and Ort´ız, 2006; International Monetary Fund, 2004, 2006).
As this is consistent with a positive sign, the significantly positive coefficients for
downgrades suggest that we may be picking up a substantial turbulence component.
Since the literature provides little guidance on whether this is what is driving our
results, we include the S&P 500 Volatility Index (VIX ), a commonly used proxy for
global risk aversion (De Santis, 2012). As expected, its coefficient is positive and
significant for both upgrades and downgrades, given the relation between market
turbulence and yield spread drift. Interestingly, the coefficient on SimActsWdwEvt
is still positive but slightly lower than before. This may be due to VIX picking
up some of the turbulence effect previously captured by SimActsWdwEvt. Hence,
there is indeed evidence that clustering may also reduce the spillover relevance of
individual rating events that take place in a period of many similar announcements
by other CRAs.
Finally, we subject our baseline regressions for downgrades to a number of robustness
checks, all of which are reported in Table A.4 in the Appendix. First, we address
extreme rating events. One might be concerned, for instance, that grouping all
downgrades of two notches or more into a single bin could obscure the impact of
a very few severe rating changes that might be driving our results (see Figure 5).
However, this is not the case as dropping downgrades of four notches or more and
three notches or more, respectively, leaves the findings unchanged.
Second, we ensure that the results on negative spillovers are not merely the product
of specific crisis episodes, namely the eurozone crisis of 2010/11 and the Asian
financial crisis of 1997/98. Again, our results appear to be more general as the key
coefficient of interest remains robust to controlling for these two crises.
Third, in 3.1 we have already argued that an estimation bias due to different degrees
of trust being placed in the three CRAs is unlikely by pointing to the distribution
of the severity of rating changes across agencies in Figure A.1 (see the Appendix).
However, the figure also shows that S&P stands out as the agency which is far less
likely than the other two CRAs to issue a large downgrade conditional on announc-
ing any downgrade at all (only 32 out of 210 negative announcements). By virtue of
their relative rarity, S&P’s large downgrades might hint at particularly strong dete-
riorations in a country’s creditworthiness and thus incite especially strong reactions
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as well. One might therefore be concerned that those might account for our baseline
result.14 Yet, controlling for this does nothing to alter the conclusion of significant
cross-border spillover effects of sovereign rating downgrades in general.
4.2 Spillover channels
After providing evidence for the existence of spillover effects in the sovereign bond
market, in particular for downgrades, we now turn to potential channels of those
spillovers. While the regressions presented so far control for a multiplicity of factors
pertaining to event and non-event countries on their own, they do not — with the
exception of ∆InitRat — account for bilateral characteristics of event and non-event
countries. However, bond market reactions in the wake of rating announcements in
other countries might differ depending on similarities and bilateral linkages, which
may be highly relevant from the perspective of policymakers.
We therefore augment our final baseline specification (Model 3 in Table 1) by
whether the event and non-event country belong to the same geographical region
(Region), whether they are members of a common major trade bloc (TradeBloc),
and the importance of the event country as an export destination for the non-event
country (ExpImpEvt). We also account for the degree of financial integration by the
event and non-event country’s capital account openness (CapOpenEvt and CapOpen-
NonEvt). Finally, we consider the size of the event country’s GDP (SizeEvt) as well
as differences between event and non-event countries in terms of GDP (∆Size) and
trend growth (∆TrendGrowth). Definitions and sources for all control variables are
reported in Table A.3 in the Appendix. The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
There is again a notable asymmetry between the findings on upgrades and those on
downgrades. This applies to both the results on the potential channels themselves
and to the impact that the inclusion of additional controls has on the robustness
of our baseline findings. Whereas the results for downgrades are highly stable and
intuitive, they paint a more nuanced picture for upgrades.
14Moreover, some studies, such as Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), continue to single out S&P
and ignore other CRAs’ announcements on the grounds that early research into sovereign credit
rating announcements found S&P’s to be less anticipated (eg, Gande and Parsley, 2005; Reisen and
von Maltzan, 1999). It is worth emphasising, though, that an agency such as Fitch, for example,
only entered the business as late as 1994. Therefore, not only were there no corresponding rating
actions to examine by earlier studies to begin with but it is also quite conceivable that part of S&P’s
alleged special position was eroded over time. The summary of more recent research provided in
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) also suggests that there is no single agency whose announcements
are generally more relevant than those of the other two CRAs.
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In more detail, we find consistently that spillover effects are significantly stronger
within the same region in the case of downgrade announcements. The coefficient
on Region has the correct sign, indicating that borrowing costs increase by up to
almost four basis points more for non-event countries in the same region as the event
country than for those outside it. Our findings appear plausible since countries in
the same geographical region are more likely to share institutional or cultural char-
acteristics and to have important real and financial links to one another. Apart from
fundamental factors, a more mundane explanation might posit that financial mar-
kets simply find non-event countries from the same region “guilty by association”.
The results are also in line with a number of studies which focus on one or more par-
ticular regions from the start (eg, Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012; Arezki et al., 2011;
De Santis, 2012). Surprisingly, we obtain positive coefficients for upgrades as well,
which would suggest that those are less likely to induce spillovers within than across
regions. While one could imagine that belonging to a particular region does not
matter for upgrade announcements due to an asymmetric perception by investors,
the fact that the coefficients are often significant is not easily rationalised. On a
positive note, though, the magnitude for upgrades is only about a third of that
for downgrades. Therefore, in the interest of comparability and as an important
economic control, we retain Region in all specifications.
The two trade controls, ie common membership in a major trade bloc (TradeBloc)
and the non-event country’s ratio of exports to the event country to domestic GDP
(ExpImpEvt), are signed as expected throughout, pointing to more pronounced
spillover effects for both upgrades and downgrades when such linkages exist, or
when they are stronger. However, they are only mildly significant once for upgrades
(see Model 7 in Table 2). Moreover, the stability in magnitude and significance of
Region upon inclusion of the trade variables, in particular for downgrades, seems to
indicate that stronger spillover effects within regions cannot easily be explained by
real linkages.15
Besides real linkages, we would ideally also like to control directly for bilateral
financial linkages, eg the exposure of non-event country investors to event country
sovereign bonds. Unfortunately, even use of the most comprehensive data from
the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey leads to a massive reduction
15The fact that the correlation of the two trade variables with the region control is low does not
support multicollinearity as a technical explanation for this result. Moreover, replacing ExpIm-
pEvt by other proxies for bilateral trade does not change the picture either (see Table A.5 in the
Appendix).
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in the number of observations and major selection effects along the time series and
country dimensions, which renders virtually impossible any comparison with the
baseline results.
However, to the extent that trade also captures a notable portion of variation in
bilateral asset holdings, our findings for real linkages also hold for financial linkages.
As shown by Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), there is indeed strong evidence that
trade is a powerful determinant of bilateral (bank) asset holdings.16 The disadvan-
tage of using trade as a proxy for financial linkages is, however, that we cannot
discriminate between the effects of real and financial linkages.
To get an idea of the distinct impact of financial linkages, we therefore approximate
financial integration by the degree of the event and non-event country’s capital ac-
count openness as measured by the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2006).17 While
this index cannot be used to gauge the effects of bilateral financial linkages, it is still
interesting in its own right to look at and control for the level effects. The results
show that the event country’s capital account openness tends to significantly am-
plify cross-border spillover effects. Since bonds of financially open countries should
be more likely to be held by foreign investors, this result is highly intuitive.
The evidence on the remaining potential channels is succinctly summarised for down-
grades. In no specification do the size of the event country’s GDP (SizeEvt), its in-
crement over that of the non-event country (∆Size), or differences in trend growth
between event and non-event countries (∆TrendGrowth) turn out to be significant
determinants of the strength of bond market spillovers. At the same time, all results
from the baseline and augmented baseline regressions (Models 1 and 2 in Table 3)
prove remarkably stable in terms of both magnitude and significance.
This contrasts with the corresponding findings for upgrades. On the one hand, we
obtain a number of interesting results for the size and growth controls. On the
other hand, the augmented regressions raise some doubts on our main variable of
interest, LARGE, in terms of statistical significance. The latter alternates between
specifications and vanishes in some, yet in view of the considerably stronger baseline
results for downgrades, this is not entirely surprising. It merely serves to underscore
16In addition, through its correlation with FDI, trade may proxy for cross-country bank exposure
since bank lending may follow domestic companies when those set up operations abroad (eg,
Goldberg and Saunders, 1980, 1981; Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996; Yamori, 1998).
17We choose this index due to its broad coverage over time, which allows us to maintain com-
parability with the baseline results. The index has also been used extensively in recent literature
(eg, Frankel et al., 2013; Fratzscher, 2012; Hale and Spiegel, 2012).
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the asymmetry that exists between positive and negative rating changes. However,
this also means that the evidence on the potential channels for upgrades should be
taken with a grain of salt.
In this regard, the most interesting result is probably the observation that, given the
event country’s size and initial rating, positive spillovers are larger the smaller the
non-event country relative to the event country (∆Size). The magnitude of the co-
efficient suggests that non-event countries which are half (two-thirds) the size of the
event country experience an additional positive spillover effect of about four (two)
basis points, as compared to non-event countries as large as the event country.18
While the effect appears to be relatively small, its direction is still interesting, in
particular when viewed in conjunction with the fact that, across the whole sample,
larger and more highly rated countries induce smaller spillovers (Models 5 to 7 in
Table 2). This would be consistent with a world in which positive spillover effects
matter primarily within a group of small developed and emerging countries but less
so within a group of large, developed countries, and in which the latter have little
impact on the former. The insignificance of the absolute difference in trend GDP
growth rates between event and non-event countries (∆TrendGrowth) as a further
measure of differences in economic development does nothing to contradict this in-
terpretation. In view of the generally more ambiguous results for upgrades, however,
we do not wish to overemphasise this point.
4.3 Discussion
Our results can be condensed into the following stylised facts. First, there is strong
evidence of statistically significant, negative spillover effects of downgrade announce-
ments. This result proves highly robust to controlling for anticipation through
watchlistings and the clustering of rating announcements. Second, negative spillover
effects are more pronounced among countries in a common region, which cannot
be explained by measurable fundamental links and similarities between countries.
Third, reactions to upgrades are, if anything, much more muted than for down-
grades, suggesting important asymmetries in the sovereign bond market’s treatment
18∆Size is defined as the difference between the event and non-event country’s log GDPs or,
equivalently, the log of the ratio of the two GDP levels. Therefore, a decrease in relative non-event
country size by half (two-thirds) amounts to an increase in ∆Size of about one hundred (fifty) per
cent. With an absolute coefficient of roughly 0.04, the (semi-elasticity) marginal effects therefore
obtain as four and two basis points, respectively.
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of the two types of announcements. Fourth, evidence on the channels behind pos-
itive spillover effects, if any, offers a more complex picture and appears relatively
ambiguous.
So, which conclusion to draw from this? To begin with, there is a strong case for the
notion that negative sovereign rating announcements, ie those of most concern to
policymakers, do matter in inducing spillovers across markets. Such is the outcome
of the explicit identification strategy used in this paper, which demonstrates that,
all other things equal, “large” downgrades of two notches or more cause larger
hikes in spreads than “small” one-notch downgrades. This suggests a role for CRAs
and their actions in sovereign bond markets, be it through the revelation of new
information on creditworthiness which acts as a “wake-up call” for investors to
reassess fundamentals in other countries (Goldstein, 1998), or simply by providing a
coordinating signal that shifts expectations from a good to a bad equilibrium (Boot
et al., 2006; Masson, 1998).
However, a major regulatory focus on the activities of CRAs would also require
negative spillover effects of substantial economic magnitude. In this paper, we find
the incremental impact of “large” downgrades to be a little over two basis points,
which may appear limited at first glance. Yet, it is important to note that this does
not represent the total effect that policymakers would be concerned about. This
can be thought of as consisting of a “base effect” that “small” downgrades have,
compared to a benchmark scenario of no downgrades anywhere, plus an additional
impact for “large” downgrades — which is what we measure. Of course, the reason
we focus on the latter lies in the impossibility of cleanly identifying the “base effects”
of rating changes unless one rules out the existence of rating-induced spillovers from
the beginning (see the discussion in 3.1). Nonetheless, the total effect is conceivably
a multiple of the one we estimate. At factors of 2 and 5, for instance, the implied
total effects amount to approximately 4 and 10 basis points, respectively. To put
this into perspective, the average sovereign bond spread vis-a`-vis US Treasuries at
the time of the downgrade announcements in our sample is 3.25 per cent, or 325
basis points. While the total effect of downgrades is relatively small in comparison,
one has to bear in mind that governments often need to refinance large amounts
of debt, which magnifies the impact of even small spread differences. Moreover,
there is still a regional effect of up to 4 basis points on top of that, suggesting that
concerns about negative spillovers in the sovereign debt market should not be lightly
dismissed.
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Finally, from a policymaker’s point of view, the finding that the increased strength of
negative spillovers within regions cannot be explained away by measurable linkages
and similarities between countries might also be a cause for concern. Even though
limited data availability precludes an all-encompassing analysis of potential chan-
nels, there is little to suggest that one can comfortably rule out that some countries
are found “guilty by association” with the event country. Moreover, such behaviour
on the part of investors would likely extend to their reactions to news other than
rating announcements. While it is hard to see an obvious remedy, the potential
problem would seem to be much more general and, above all, rooted in investor
behaviour. Hence, it is not clear that putting the primary emphasis on CRAs will
prove effective in this regard.
5 Conclusion
Concerns about negative spillovers across sovereign debt markets in the wake of
sovereign rating changes have recently resurfaced on the agenda of policymakers. In
this paper, we study the existence and potential channels of such spillover effects.
More specifically, we avail of an extensive dataset which covers all sovereign rating
announcements made by the three major agencies and daily sovereign bond market
movements of up to 73 developed and emerging countries between 1994 and 2011.
Based on this, we propose an explicit counterfactual identification strategy which
compares the bond market reactions to small changes in an agency’s assessment of
a country’s creditworthiness to those induced by all other, more major revisions. In
doing so, we account for a number of factors that might impact on the reception of
individual announcements.
We find strong evidence in favour of negative cross-border spillovers in the wake
of sovereign downgrades. At the same time, there is no similarly robust indication
as to positive spillovers since reactions to upgrades are much more muted at best,
which points to an important asymmetry in the sovereign debt market’s treatment
of positive and negative information. Regarding the channels of negative spillover
effects, our results suggest that those are more pronounced for countries within the
same region. Strikingly, however, this cannot be explained by fundamental linkages
and similarities, such as trade, which turn out to be insignificant.
Therefore, there is reason to believe that policymakers’ concerns about negative
spillover effects are not unfounded. In fact, the lack of power of a set of fundamentals
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in explaining the added regional component may reinforce, or give rise to, concerns
about the ability of investors to discriminate accurately between sovereigns. This
could also be of more general interest because such behaviour is likely to carry over
to reactions to various kinds of non-CRA news in other markets and sectors, too.
Hence, important though they are, a sole focus on CRAs and their actions might be
missing a bigger picture.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Sovereign bond yield data sources and availability
Bloomberg (33 countries)
1994 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States (January), Switzerland (Febru-
ary)
1997 Portugal (February), Greece (July)
1998 Hong Kong (March), Singapore (June), India (November)
1999 Taiwan (April)
2000 Thailand (January), Czech Republic (April), South Korea (December)
2002 Slovakia (June), Romania (August)
2006 Israel (February)
2007 Slovenia (March)
2008 Iceland (April)
JP Morgan EMBI Global (41 countries)
1994 Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela (January), China (March), Brazil
(April), Bulgaria (July), Poland (October), South Africa (December)
1995 Ecuador (February)
1996 Turkey (June), Panama (July), Croatia (August), Malaysia (October)
1997 Colombia (February), Peru (March), Philippines, Russia (December)
1998 Lebanon (April)
1999 Hungary (January), Chile (May)
2000 Ukraine (May)
2001 Pakistan (January), Uruguay (May), Egypt (July), Dominican Republic
(November)
2002 El Salvador (April)
2004 Indonesia (May)
2005 Serbia (July), Vietnam (November)
2007 Belize (March), Kazakhstan (June), Ghana, Jamaica (October), Sri Lanka
(November), Gabon (December)
2008 Georgia (June)
2011 Jordan (January), Senegal (May), Lithuania, Namibia (November)
Notes — This table lists the sources of the sovereign bond yield data in the sample and the years in which the
respective time series are first observed (months in parentheses). If there are gaps in the Bloomberg 10-year generic
yield series, we add observations of 10-year generic yields from Datastream, ensuring that this does not induce
structural breaks. Moreover, for some emerging countries we include 10-year generic yields until the EMBI Global
series become available.
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Table A.2: Rating scales and transformation
Characterisation of debt
and issuer
Letter rating Linear
transformation
S&P Moody’s Fitch
Highest quality
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
AAA Aaa AAA 17
High quality
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16
AAA Aa2 AA 15
AA– Aa3 AA– 14
Strong payment capacity
A+ A1 A+ 13
A A2 A 12
A– A3 A– 11
Adequate payment
capacity
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10
BBB Baa2 BBB 9
BBB– Baa3 BBB– 8
Likely to fulfil obligations,
ongoing uncertainty
S
p
ec
u
la
ti
ve
gr
ad
e
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7
BB Ba2 BB 6
BB– Ba3 BB– 5
High credit risk
B+ B1 B+ 4
B B2 B 3
B– B3 B– 2
Very high credit risk
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+
CCC Caa2 CCC
CCC– Caa3 CCC–
Near default with
possibility of recovery
CC Ca CC 1
C
Default
SD C DDD
D DD
D
Notes — This table shows how the letter ratings used by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch correspond to one another and
to different degrees of credit risk, and how they are mapped into the linear 17-notch scale used in the investigation.
The transformation is the same as in Afonso et al. (2012), from which this table is adapted.
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Table A.5: Spillover channels, downgrades — Different trade measures
Trade measure
ExpImpEvt TradeImpEvt ExpShEvt TradeShEvt
LARGE 0.0244*** 0.0246*** 0.0244*** 0.0246***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073)
InitRat -0.0031 -0.0030 -0.0031 -0.0030
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
∆InitRat 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
OnWatch -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0060)
SimActsWdwEvt 0.0141** 0.0145** 0.0141** 0.0145**
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069)
SimActsDayNonEvt 0.1136* 0.1129* 0.1137* 0.1129*
(0.0619) (0.0619) (0.0619) (0.0619)
VIX 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Region 0.0348** 0.0324* 0.0345** 0.0326*
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0167)
TradeBloc 0.0120 0.0139 0.0118 0.0139
(0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0121)
Trade measure 0.0580 0.0517 0.0298 0.0247
(0.2268) (0.1143) (0.0659) (0.0538)
CapOpenEvt 0.0126** 0.0131** 0.0127** 0.0131**
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063)
CapOpenNonEvt 0.0081 0.0088 0.0081 0.0088
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0089)
SizeEvt 0.0247 0.0259 0.0244 0.0258
(0.0330) (0.0333) (0.0330) (0.0332)
∆Size -0.0146 -0.0187 -0.0144 -0.0186
(0.0253) (0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0255)
∆TrendGrowth 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
N 19,724 19,511 19,715 19,502
Event countries 79 79 79 79
Non-event countries 70 70 70 70
Downgrades 405 405 405 405
R2 0.0434 0.0435 0.0434 0.0435
Notes — This table shows the robustness of our results on the spillover channels of downgrade announcements
to different measures of bilateral trade linkages. For purposes of comparison, we first report the results from the
most comprehensive specification using ExpImpEvt, the non-event country’s exports to the event country relative
to non-event country GDP (see Model 7 in Table 3). Alternatively, we use TradeImpEvt, which is bilateral trade
(imports + exports) with the event country relative to non-event country GDP. Finally, ExpShEvt and TradeShEvt
measure the event country’s share in the non-event country’s total exports and total bilateral trade, respectively.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of rating changes, by agency
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Notes — This figure shows the distribution of the severity of rating changes by agency, measured on a 17-notch scale
(see Table A.2). Numbers are based on the sample of 1,097 rating announcements (635 upgrades, 462 downgrades)
made by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch between 1994 and 2011.
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